The Time Is Right for a Dispassionate Assessment
Although the debate about the appropriateness of gene patents has raged for decades, last year's stunning decision by the US District Court for the Southern Dis- The court decision, which focused on Myriad Genetics' patents on the BRCA1 2 (breast cancer 1, early onset) and BRCA2 (breast cancer 2, early onset) mutations and is currently under appeal, effectively concluded that human genes are not patentable subject matter-despite the facts that patents on genes have been granted since the 1980s and that 20% of the human genome, by some estimates, is associated with at least one patent.
This astonishing decision is, from a technical perspective, based on some rather ingenious legal reasoning that removes human DNA from the grasp of the traditional rationale that has long been used by courts and patent examiners to allow the patenting of naturally occurring substances. That rationale is as follows: As long as something, even something that exists in nature, can be isolated, purified, and made useful, it may be patentable. In the context of the Myriad Genetics case, however, Judge Robert W. Sweet concluded that although the genes may have been isolated, they were not different, in any meaningful way, from the naturally occurring form. The genes referred to in the Myriad Genetics patent are, the judge declared, merely unaltered copies of the encoded genetic information that exists in nature and, as such, are not patentable.
Despite the legalistic interpretation that is the backbone of the not-patentable conclusion-an interpretation of the law that has gained support from none other than the US Department of Justice (3 )-it is clear from a reading of the judgment that Judge Sweet is not a fan of gene patents. Indeed, he seems to accept conclusions about "the chilling effect of gene patents on the advancement of both genetic research and clinical testing." In support of these kinds of social concerns, Judge Sweet references a handful of studies, including the often-cited survey of laboratory directors by Cho et al., (4 ) . That study found that 53% of the respondents agreed that the existence of a patent had led them to decide "not to develop or perform a test/service for clinical or research purposes."
The study of Cho et al. is interesting and valuable, but it is hardly definitive-especially when placed in the context of a growing body of empirical evidence that points in a different direction. Although it is probably unfair to criticize Judge Sweet for his selective use of data (in general, judges can work only with the evidence that is presented within the context of a trial), the decision does little to help moderate the polarized nature of the patent debates.
What Does the Evidence Actually Say about the Impact of Gene Patents?
In fact, the available research paints a complex and rather muddled picture. Many studies, none of which were referenced in Judge Sweet's judgment, have found that gene patents have little or no negative impact on the research environment. For example, a 2005 survey of 398 academics found that only 1% reported suffering a research delay because of a patent (5 ) . A large international survey by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, published in 2007, came to a similar conclusion. This report (6 ) states there is "very little evidence of an 'anticommons problem'" (a phrase often used to describe the adverse impact of patents on research). Our own survey involving the Canadian genomics community also found no clear patent problem (7 ) . A recent study by a European team found that "very few blocking patents exist" (8 ) . On the clinical side, a 2011 study from the UK concluded that there is little support for the idea that patents were having an adverse impact on patient access (9 ) .
These kinds of data-and there is much morehave led numerous patent scholars to conclude that there is a striking "paucity" of documented examples of patent problems (10 ) and that "[e]mpirical data do not yet confirm the existence of a patent thicket [another term used to describe patent problems] in genetics at large" (11 ) .
One should not overlook, however, that on the patents-are-needed-to-promote-innovation side of the debate, the data are also far from compelling. Indeed, despite assertions by industry, there is scant empirical support for the notion that patent protection is essential to stimulate innovation in the context of genetics (12 ) .
In all fairness, new studies that use unique approaches are emerging (13, 14 ) , and problems with the current patent system may yet be found. My point, however, is not that we have a definitive answer about the impact of patents. On the contrary, my point is that we simply do not know. Anyone who asserts otherwise is at best overstating the situation or, at worst, being deceptive.
The bottom line, as nicely summarized by Chandrasekharan and Cook-Deegan (15 ) , is that there is absolutely "no consensus about whether DNA sequence patents hinder or help in the development and availability of genetic diagnostics" and, more to the point, that the "alleged negative consequences and benefits of patents have . . . often been grossly overstated."
This Hyperbole Almost Certainly Harms the Policy Debates, But It May Also Distract Us from More-Pressing Science Policy Issues
As noted, gene patents are often declared to hurt the research environment. That is a central theme in the antipatent playbook, as found in Judge Sweet's decision. Although we have little (solid) proof that patents obstruct basic research, there is evidence that other forces-such as commercialization pressure-can have an adverse impact, including promoting secrecy, the withholding of data (16 ) , and decreasing collaborative relationships (17 )-to say nothing of the influence that links with industry can have on the integrity of research more broadly.
In a world in which research budgets are justified in the language of economic stimulation and researchers are under intense and increasing pressure to commercialize, build ties with industry, and quickly translate research from the laboratory to the clinic, a focus on the possible problems caused by gene patents seems slightly misplaced and akin to kicking the shin of an oppressive and grumpy giant. It might be a good start to your fight, but it seems unlikely to resolve anything. If we remove gene patents without altering the commercialization focus of the research environment, will the issues so often associated with patents go away? Doubtful.
During His 2011 State of the Union Address, President Obama Told Everyone in the US That This Was a "Sputnik Moment"
This allusion was not meant to inspire a new generation of curiosity-driven researchers to reach for the stars in the name of Cold War propaganda. Rather, Obama's Sputnik challenge is much more earthly. He is after an economic and commercial vessel, one that he hopes will generate "countless new jobs" in a country where, as Obama put it, the "free-enterprise system . . . drives innovation."
With this expectation of commercialization placed on the shoulders of researchers and with so much changing in the area of genetics (indeed, low-cost whole-genome sequencing is poised to fundamentally alter diagnostics and, concomitantly, the role of pat-ents), now is not the time for a polarized and potentially distracting debate. We need a clearheaded analysis of what the data tell us, an assessment of where further empirical work is required, and, most importantly, an informed and hyperbole-free discussion about the most constructive role of intellectual property in the realm of biomedical research.
